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1. Several years ago~ from this platform, I presented n paper with 
the title "A proposal concerning English prepositions, 11 (Fillmore, 
1966). That was the first public exposure of a.n effort that a few 
montl-is later resulted in a longish paper called "The case for caset 11 
(Fill.more, 1968). I suggested in these pe.pers that a. new order of 
concepts should be incorporated into the theory of transformational 
grammar; I spoke of deep structure cases; and my hope was that their 
existence could be discovered and justified by syntactic criteria 
and that their presence in underlying representations of sentences 
would have the effect of reducinp the burden of the semantic inter-
pretation component of a grammar. In spite of an over-exuberant 
f'ina.l section in "The case for case," I thought of' my work, not as 
a proposal to eliminate deep structures altogether~ but as an effort 
to find a level of syntactic structure which wa.s deeper than that 
offered by the then standard theory. My position was what would now 
be called deep structure interEretivist; and since my efforts were 
largely directed toward the classification of lexical items and the 
at.i.alysis of complement patterns of ordini:try verbs and a.dJ ectives, it 
was of the sort that today would be called lexicalist. 
In his chapter on ttResidual p:roblems" nea.:r the end of 
Aspects of the Theor~· o:f Syntax~ (Chomsky~ 1965) Chomsky reminds us of 
the failure of the theory presented in that book to deal with the 
fact that 11in some unclear sense" the:re is something in common 
betveen the [meJ of [John strikes me as pompous, J and the [IJ of 
(I regard John as pompoua.J. There are semantic functions or noun-
phrases vhich are not assignable to their syntactic positions on 
either the deep-structure or the surface-structure level. 1{'{ 
suggestion in those early papers was tho.t the notion of deep 
structure could be recast in such a vcy that certain sorts of semantic 
functions of noun-phrases could be represented directly and that the 
structuring o~ sentences according to whicb they can be said to have 
subjects and objects could be taken care of by means of the trans-
formational apparatus o~ the grammar; my hope was that these semantic 
functions would turn out to include those mentioned by Chomsky in 
the "Residual problems" chapter, 
*This paper was presented at the 1971 Georgeto\.l!l. Roundtable on 
Linguistics, at Georgetown University on March 11, 1971. 
The dee1, CU.\;e proi;iqsals derived more directly from an tnter~~t 
i r~ lanF,uages .:t,111'1.t hn"."e case ·syst~ms in their nqun mo:r'nhoiogy. I ai:n fart1ili~r 
with the cla,ssice.1 p.:ranw~r tradition of iclentifyinp: on·e ri.:t a -tiie the 
caseR in which nouns ;COUld be irif'lected and listing with each case. 
the 1'uses 1' t6 !fhich ii;; qould be put. As a .generative g;r8lllr.larian. 
looking at tilis tradit}on, I surmised--:-~in the .,;,8¥ thatRenera.tiii.sts 
do-.-tho.t .where our ancestors went Tn"Ong was in confus.ing vhat was 
:t,2.:.._be. explain£.\! with wha.t ought to 9e take~ ~s fi_iVen. · In tha:t e11rl~er 
vfew. what wa.s ta.ken as given was the information that the languo.µ"e 
has such-anq.;..such -ca.a~~ ' and what the grammarian ·neede:'ci to _expla.(r;i 
was how each of the cases could oe used. We should reverse this, I 
a~sumed, and should take the case uses a.s basic .and regard the 
obser\l'a.bl.e case forms '.as derivable from them b;ir rules of the graw.mar. 
I found encouro.gem.ent in this ambition oy' the observation .that 
the case uses had a. lot in common bet~·een one. language and another:.· 
one m·an 's "Dative .of Person Affected" was another man t's '.1.Aecusative 
of.Person Affected," a.n~ one rrinn•s "Abiative of Pers9nal .J\.e;ent" y.a,s 
·another man is 11Da.tive of Personal Agent.,. Because of this apparent 
comtnonality a~ross languages,· .it seemed to me that the ~a.se use;:i. 
should be posited for all languages, including then those 'which lacked 
:inorphologic,:µ case inflections e.itop;ether. By this bei,ng do~e ~- ~he 
same sorts of underlying semantic functions couJ,.d be seen e.s :reBlized 
in the form of case endings in one language, as prepositional or post-
31ositional constructions in another, or in some quite di-fferent way
in a third; ·· · · 
I have ·learned a few thirigs·since those days: I now know what  
"ergative" me~s; frqm 8: number or extremel:i• polite colleagues I.  
learned about the ka.raka·theory of Pioini; I have become·somewha.:t  
more conscious of the importance which semantic f'unctic,ns ·of the  
·sort ·which have interested me have ha.din non-transformationalist but 
m~lti-ievel theories· 01' grammatfoa.:L structure; and, mor~ :importantly, 
I have in the me~time·ericountered an exceedingiy large number of 
desdriptive_probiems that turned out to be .intractable within the 
model as· I had been conceiving it. . . . .. 
I beiieve to this day that the be.sic.ideas were not _all ·wron1-;, 
in sp1te of the fact that most of the specific a.nalys~·s I proposed  
in ·those first papers were bad ones. Thes~ days I ·part1,.y as a kind of  
intellectual. exercise~ and partly out of nosta.lp;ia or stubborrine~s.  
I am in the p~ocess of preparing a version of~ase grammar with  
sm.e of the ·sna.c;·s worked out and some or the -;;tails · ·-· 
worked in~ 'l'hnt ·stu<l;r is rar f'rom cornolete: ,,,hat I -honP  
to do in this -paper h simply to expose some of the difficulties  
"of ta.ct ~nd prin«:?iple" which the model faces, and maybe even to  
suggest, :rrom time tb time, that the proponents of alternati,ve views  
a.re not Ill.ways clearly better off ~th respect to th.ese "!)roblems.  
2, I see a transformational gr~ar with a .case bas!;!-~ having in  
g~neral the following properties. The propositipniil core of' e. simple  
seri,tence COhl;l1StB of a predicator· (:verb, adjective or noun) in  
construction with one or more entities, ea.ch of these rel.a.te_d tp the  
predicator in one of the semantic furictious·known a.s (deeu. - structure)- . . . . 
cas~s •. The ca.se·s identify the roles which the entities 'serve in 
tl1~ predicati9ri, these r~les te.k~n from ~ repertory defined once 
and £or _all for human la~guages and includi~g that of the insti~ntor 
of an action, that of the experiencer of a ~sychologicai event. that
of an object which undergoes a. chan8e or mo;ement,· that of the 
location of e.n event, an"d so on. {I recognize the emptiness of thi:;; 
assumption in the a.bs¢nc~ of a coh~rerit gra.mmatic,13]_ theory in which 
the cases pla:l a crucial role. . I will address .lJIYself to this question
sho.rtiy.) · · · · · · · · 
The cases exist in- a hierarchy, and this hierarchy serves to 
guide the operation of certain syntactic processes, in particular 
that of subject selection. It figUres in subject selection by 
determining whic.h noun-phrase · is to become the subject c,f ·the 
sentence in the "unmarked" instance. That case. in a sentence wnich, 
according to the hierarchy of cases, outranks.the others, is the one 
which has the'noun-:phr~se·it' is associated with selected as the 
subject of the sentence, · 
Certain predicators have their o.rn lexically determined subje~t 
-choices, and there a.re furthermore certain subject choice options 
provided QY the language•-among them that provided in English by 
the .passive transformatii;m. A srammar must the:refore provide some 
wey:of r~-ranking the cases for particulnr sehtences. {Nly present 
practice is to'reflect the subject·choice hierarchy in the left-tci-
right order. of the cases .in the deep s'tructtire representation of 
individual. sentences, and.to allow the.subject selection process 
merely to sele~t the'l~ft-i:nost noun.:.phrase in the list. The trans-
forri.iations· vhich re-rank. these el'ements the1,1 are transformations 
which move some initially non-le:ft-moat element into the left-most 
position in the list of :cases.) 
.The surface cases in case languages, and the prepositions or 
postpositions· or other syntactic fun~tion indicators in other 
languages, are•determined by various sorts of in:formation about the 
sentence, just one of these being the id~fftity ~f the deep'-structure 
cases; 'others have to 'do with the operation of the sub,1ect and ob,ject 
seiection proce~ses, facts about definiteness and animateness and 
the like, and~ for nouns that en~er into the various types of locative 
construction9 , the dimensionality of the entity being designated. 
The lexical items in a la.nguage which are capable of servinR as 
.predicators--and this set includes not onl.v- all contentives but most 
connectives--can be cla~sified according to the possible arrays of 
.cases that they can occur in construction with. Lexical items can 
be further described by i.dentifyinp;.the grammatical processes which 
are triggered by or made possible by their presence in a.sentence.· 
·sentences that are embedded in underlying representations are. 
embedded as qccupants of some case role. By processes that are 
familiar if not vell understood, embedded sentences. can have c:omple-
mentizers attached to them, t,hey can be nominalized, they 'can have 
sort1e o:{ their ~pnstitµents "promoted" to become constituents pf the 
sentences into which they have '!}een .embedded,'and so on. 
Very briefi:,; the·n, these are the main, ~h~acteristics of a 
trans:f.orma.tiona.1 gra.rn:mar. vhose base· component speci:fies the -case 
structure of sentences. I have left vague the way in which the case 
identity of a noun-ph~ase is to be symboli~ed, because that, as it 
happens, is one of our problems. I have left vague the relationship 
between the 11entities" that have case roles in what I described as 
the structure of simple sentences, and the· noun-phrases that show 
up in particular positions in sentences, because that is every-one 1 s 
problem. 
3. The whole thing makes sense only if there a.re good reasons to 
believe that there is an irreducible number of role types by which 
g~nnunatical theory makes its contribution to semantic interpretation; 
if it turns out that this number is small; if there are reasonable 
principles according to vhich the$e role types can be identified; 
e.nd if grammars in which they a.re incorpo:ra:ted into underlying 
representations are s"Uperior to those in which they are not. There 
are certain criteria that I have appealed to in attempting ta 
determine the cases, and I will speak of them now. They are not 
outstandingly confidence-inspiring~ given the fact that I have changed 
my mind so many times in the past few years about the rulalysis of 
a number of sentence types, but I believe there is something to them 
nevertheless. 
Fir$t or all I make the assumption tha.t there is in a. single 
c1ause at most one noun-phrase (which ma.y! of course~ be compound) 
uerving a. given case role, If we accept th:ie one-instance-per-clause 
principle, we are required to deal with apparent counter-examples 
either by showing that the putative identical case roles are in fact 
distinct, or by showing that the constrl\ction is better treated ea 
an instance of clause embedding. 
Let I s consider first a situation in which the embedding anal;rsi s 
is preferred. Suppose that one of' the case roles that ve intuitively 
recognize is that of the Agent. and suppose that in a sentence like 
[John compellad his son to atab the usher.J, we perceive agency in 
both what John doea and in what his son does. The one-instance-per-
clause prinai:ple requires us to analyze the sentence as being cle.use.lly 
complex. and it compe1s us not to analyr.e [compel to stab] as a sin~le 
discontinuoua verb. (If e.11 languages were like English, with the 
elements of Ccompel to $tabJ distriouted in different places in the 
sentence, we could say that this ap:f>lication of the principle i.s of 
use in beating dead horses with stra·,i men. The :principle takes on 
some interest, however, in a. language in vhich the notion· ucompel to 
stab11 has surface lexical unity.} 
Let's consider next a situation in which we will allow ourselves 
to change our minds about the case identity of two noun phrases in a 
sentence. Take a sentence like CJohn resembles Fred.J. It might be 
believed that in this sentence the two nouns CJohnJ and CFredJ have 
the same role. One reason for believing such n thing is that i~ the 
two noun-phrases straddling the verb CresembleJ both deaignate 
entities which a.re more or lesa eq_uelly observationally e.ccessible, 
it must always be true that if the first resembles the second, the 
second resembles the first. Since the analysis as a complex sentence 
does not suggest itself in this instance, the one-instance-per-clause 
principle ~ives me the responsibility of showin~ that the semantic 
roles. of the two nouns ar"e. distinct. I would have ·to say that the ·"two 
entities are soniehow taken' in diff~re.nt vays. i 'might begin by ' 
suggesting that the senten.ce CJohn resembles Fred. J invo1ves. the 
judgment that certain properties observable in John are ·relata.ble to 
propertj.es attributable to Fred, with the secor,id noun-phras·e servinR 
to.' identify a. ,stan~e.rd according to which th~ entity nameq. by the 
firs:t noWl-phras.e is a.ssitned some .sort of a position. This· being so~ 
it should follow that the two roles associated with CresembleJ can be 
occupied by instances of different 'types of noun-phrases~ or by noun-
phrases having dtfferent assumptions about existence or observability 
associated with them. It ,should be p9ssible., in .other W<;)rds,. to p1,1t 
in the second position, but not in the first position, noun-phrases 
which are generi,6a.J.ly understood or which designate non-existent:entities, 
even wheri the.noun-phrase in the first position-is a referring expression. 
This·predictioti is borne out, because the two :noun-plirases cannot be 
interche.nged.in'properly understood ree.dings·o'f the.sentences CTh~t 
donkey ,resembles a. unicorn.J, [John resembles a horse.]~ 9r (John 
resembles his famous ancestor.J • 
. ,So much for.· the first principle. Nmt sometimes a sine;le J)redice.tor 
tak.es noun-phra!Ses. ·of different qas~~ ~ occurririg :i.n one sente:nce wit.h 
one choice of cases,.in another with a. different choice. Since in 
English every·isentence has to ho.ve.a subject. oi:-e place to l'ook for the 
variety or cases is in subject :posi-tion. We firid that the relation · 
which~ subject has to its clause ca.n vary from one predicntor to 
another, natµraliy, but it can also varJ in different se~ten~es with 
the same predicator. 
By Illustration, take sentences containing the adjective [we.rm] •. 
A S\11:lject noun-'phrase with this adjective can name: the experiencerof 
this sensation;· something' ·:whlch when: used can result in someone .. 
exp,eriencing the sensation,; a time period during which th~y can 
eXl)erience the sensiation; ·or a place ·1n ·which they can experience the 
sensation. If ve want ':to ,assign names to ~hese functions, ve mit;r.ht 
speak of Experiencer, as in CI em wa.rm. J; Instrwn.ent, as i.n [This 
jacket is wa.rm.J, Time, as in CSummer is wa.rm.J; and Loca'tiori, as in 
(The ~oom is warn.J. 
My second assumption, then, is that if one takes a predicator which 
is intuitively seen a.s assigning diff~rent semantic functions to nomi.-
phra.ses that oc6urin specif'ic syntactic.positions with respect to it, 
ther.e shouJ.d be .a, _n~tural stotmin~ point in any attempt to classify these 
semantic functions. If' that turns out to be true, and if it is also 
true.that one finds comparable lists of functions in the analysis of 
noun~phx·a.ses that occur ...,,1th other p:redicato:rs, we ca.n believe that . 
we are on the right track. We might be encouraged, for example, if' we 
tried an analysis of' the .subject roles occurring vith the adjective 
[sauj, beca.use·it is not unnatural to claim that for sentences like 
[Johp was sad. J .and [ 'lhe I11ovie vas sad.. J,. the emotion-experiencer role 
of CJohnJ in the former ii'i •. anw.ogous to the sensa.tion-experiencer o 
role of [IJ -:tn tI am warm!J, and that the experience-eliciting role 
of tmovieJ in C'l'he movie w:a.s sad. J is analogous to that or [Jacket] in 
(This .jacket is warm.) · 
.~ . :..·. . ' .... . ~ , ( :-: . 
$ • •• '...
' . 
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I~ is ·!=)11,e thi.np;. to ' see i-f· thk~e ·:is . ti, s.t ofo,ing .plac~ in the ·~~:tempt 
· · 1;6 ),i'st the ~ema.nti~ f\ln~ti_oi'ls t.li~t P,0 Witli :~ji_y. g1.Vf:!?l ,;')redicator,,~ · . 
'another th:lnp; . to see U' the i 'ist. ·.of semantic-.,.functions.. found. f'or '' 
different predicators h'aye enougi_i',-overlf).p to make· .it .b~}.i~ve.1=?'1~.: ~bat . 
th~re i;, a ·SJU~ll list :t'or gr~t ioa.l tneorf in Rener·a1.. It is s'tiil'. 
another 'thi~ to inquire vhether· the functions that :by~·:this t>roc~ss 
w,~.take. a.c;' aJstinct ~~ ~ fact '~emiaai,ly.''· d~stinct; ·fi1,1d for- tJ'le.t-'~.re . . 
n~e·c1 to find . o't,her sorts . of ·e,rid~nce ... I l;>elleve· tha~ : $UCh evi~e*'e . :can 
be'. found. th9ugh i ~ requ_:f,r.es a,n .appeal to .~Y,nto.ctic coµ~_trµctions vhJch 
~r,e .not in the~selv:es --~erfectly we'll unders1;oo~. When': tl_le co.mpa..fa:tive 
cqnstr uctiQn ·compares twp noun-phrases and wh.en, the regular ,coordir);:t.e 
conjunction 'construction unites t vo noun.-phra.ses. the. noun~phrasos 
y~dch are brought 1:,oget~r ~ust ·i1a:v~. the s~e-.case ro~e .i.n the se,ritenc~s 
· in·Which t~~y"·o~cur. \iith [aad), ,it .-is pos_s.i_ble to -~.O.MJ?e.fe two ~X~eriencC.T'S, . 
as tn [John i,s' as sad 8.S· 1'~re(1. J, arid with .Cv.arroJ it is' possible to · 
· C()ll).pare two ·i nstruments; as in CMy sweater fa"? -WSrl'.ller ·th'~n your jacket! J ; 
but ~uch m_i,.ctures of c~ses as th~t. suggested by CLate·l.y· I've beeri sadder 
th~n "Love Story. "J qr t'My Jacket. i~ ,,iarm.et .than Texas~~ will .riot do. 
$~m:tlar1y with'. conjunction, i-t 1s !3,~l right: f.9 sey (;J'q_!ln and Fre~ ere . 
b(?th sad~ J ?i<..t-My swef,l:t~f- qnd y~ti:~ Ja.eke~ a:r.e ·both ve:r:y warm. J, but 
not- ~John anq. tl.l~ m<>:v.ie .both became ; very s4d near the ·.e'~d. l ,, or: CMy.. · 
.sw'ea:ter and ':I are l;><'.>th nice ~nd \ia.tm~ l. · · · 
· .- ~ ~ ·_ass~tion.~ tJla:t I'v.e ~ritionecl ~<? .far are fc;>r d~termi-~inp;
~hen we ·:are deo.li,ng wi,th . distinct ,e~~es witlf'·~iv~ri 'pi::~~cators, -~d ~ 
may. refer tcf themas pr'inci9les •of tontrastJ .Next . w~ 'can ·consid.'1:Jr n .. 
))·l'i)Jcipie -Ot'. complernehtarit:;i:•. (~Q·s~ of yo~. ¥~Q . ~e OV~?'. forty ·~llill 
he ff.Ull ilia.r wi~h .thcs:e · te-rrns . ) Sometimes . ii.!=! find in ,different .s~ptenc~s 
7ema.ntic: 'runc~fons \lhich in det'ail ·are paz:tir ~ike ~~ .partly d~ffer~nt., 
their difference.s bei.nP, syst 'eme.tj,'co.lly -relatable .to dj,f!'erences i n · 
th~ semantic j)roperti~~ of the le,xical mat.eris.I they --~re .i n coris:ti~uct,ion 
¥ith. (I r.e-f'u.se even t.p mention -t~e t_ermit:iblop:icnl ·i1orror of sp~aking 
he're of alio..:Cases of the .saJne caseme.) Wit.h verbs of ·-iiiotion, li.ke for 
examp1~ Cgol, we can sriecif"r a starting poirit ai1d . a . desti~ation , .. '.~S 
tn a .sentence l ike [Jl~-~ent. tro.;; ··t}le :t~p of.'.th; hiil tq, 'the cem~t·e~y 
r:ate .] ; for tr.~sforrna.ti,on verbs :we .can specify th~ ear.lier stat.e and 
tlie later state, a~ :in· a s'entence iike me. changed fr.om a 96-pound 
·..reakling i'n'.to a famous f'o0.tbo.l.l l,}'erp. J; and for veros· of t _em:pora,i 
la:pse we can.·talk ab9ut· the sta.rti~ and e~d.~np.; point of .a ·.time _pe;riod, 
·a~ i ~ CThe pa~ennt lasted from suri.<1:0,m until ·midnight. J, '. My inc1inatio_n 
is to refer to the two J.)04,nts identified in e.11 of :thes.e e,&.rli!:!r/ · 
._,later indica:tioos as di .£f erent il}stances qf the =!>OJne '¢a~es, namely 
Spurce a.nd G(le.l. Depending ori ttte type pf pr_edicator, · the Source an~ 
Goal are interpreted' as· earlie.r ~d later locat~ons, .e~rlier and, later 
~ta.tes . or e~lier -~n4 ·1a1;er time. points. . 
. . Ila.vine come upon s_ucli 0. decision. we .inust immediately fi~'ire out 
'~•tu~t to do Wit~ certa;itl. a.pyiarent counter-exru1:rp],es •. . Ari·, ~ · S8l!lple !110tiOn 
:verb ·I delfborntely cho:r.~ ~he yei,"b CgoJ , . be.cause it _if# oµe whi~h ~s a 
'!19tion verb p~re and s~mple ~ ~ge>._J · and CcofueJ and Em~v.e~ al"e just _.about 
t~1e only motton verbs ·;1:n !!:ngli~h whi_ch hav~ ·.as.cocia-ce~ "With. the~ 
.no ·u
. 
nderst!!tn&ing .of :mann
• 
er . m~ans · or l!lecii,um ~ 
.! . 
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In sentences .rt.th other verbs of motion, houever: it ~ight indeed look 
as if w~ need to distinguish as se:pal"a.te cases temporal Source and 
Goa.l from apa.tie.1 Source and Goa.J.. To see -what I mean, consider 
the fact that ve can say either [He walked from the top of the 
hill to the cemetery gate.J or [He walked from noon until sundown.J. 
If ve say that the verb Cva.lkJ ce.n occur with either temporal or 
spatial Sources or Goals, we are then required to come up with 
special explanations of \Thy they cannot all occur in a single 
serite·nce, e.nd why they cannot be mixed in the same sentence. That 
is, we cannot say CHe walked from the tol) of the hill to the 
cemetery gate from noon until sundown.); nor can we say [He walked. 
from the eernetery gate until midnight.:! or me walked from noon to· 
the ioo.J. To account for these facts we must either (i) increase 
the nwriber of cases by positing both spatial and temporal Source and 
Goal cases and introduce some constraints on their co-occurrence 
possibilities in single clauses, or (ii) reanalyze sentences with 
[walk), CswimJ, [run], CdriveJ, etc., in a way that will allo·.r them to 
oe -created e.s rererring ei:ther to types of a.cti..:vities, describable in 
terms o" their durations, or to types of inove1nents, de-s cribable in 
terms of their 1,1a.ti1s. "rhe question of which of these choices is 
pret'erable is one or the problems I will discuss shortly. 
4. · The principles I have just been talking about are fairly va. ue, 
they seldom lead to beautifully unambiguous results, and they are 
alwa.:rs subject to other sorts of considerations. Be that as it ma.v, 
I have lately become comfortable with the followin~ cases: A~ent, 
Experiencer, Instrument, Obje.ct, Source, Goal, Place and Time. There 
is one more, but I'm saving that till later. I used to talk about 
"Datives," but I have reanalyzed the old Dative by spreadinp: it 
around among the other cases. Where there is a genuine psycholo~ical 
event or mental state verb, we have the Experiencer; vhere there is 
a non-psychological verb which indicates a change of state, such 
as one or dying or growing, we have the Ob,1ect; where there is n 
transfer or movement of something to a person. the receiver as 
destination is taken as the Goal. I no longer confu$e selection 
restrictions to animates with true case-like notions. 
There are certain difficulties in stating exactly what one 
ought to mean by "Agent," but I am willing to -leave those unresolved 
for no\ot. I talce the Instrument, for which I would be happy to find 
a better name, as the case of the immediate cause of an event, or, 
in the case of a psychological predicator, the stimulus, the thing 
reacted to. When the Instrument role is occupied by a. sentence, 
that sentence identifies an event which is understood as having 
some other event or state as its consequence. The Object ca.se is 
that of the entity which moves or which undergoes chan~e, e.nd I 
still use it as a wastebasket. Sentences embedded to Objects ca.~ 
serve to identify, for example, the content of a psychological event, 
as with verbs of judging or, imagining. Source and Goal 8.l"e used in 
the ways I suggested earlier, and in a few other va.ys as well. 
Since the Goal. case is used to indicate the later state o:r end 
result of some action or chanp;e, it can absorb what I used to call 
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'JResulta.ti 'iren or "Fa.ctitive11 ; that is, it specifies the end-result 
role or {i, thing whi~!}~comes into Ei;Kistence as a result of the'action 
idet1tified by the predicator. and in CI wrote ·a poem, J or Cl 
constructed a bridge,J A sentence embedded as Goal, therefore, is 
one which identifies·the·resulting state or event ·in a causative 
construction, 
The case hierarchy is that of the order in which I listed 
them: Agent, Experiencer, Instrument, Object, Source, Goal, Place, 
Time. The case in a given sentence vhich occurs first on this list 
determined what is to be the subject of the sentence in, as I said, 
the "unmarked" instance. For psycho1ogical verbs it ls important 
to notice that the E:xperiencer :precedes the Instrument (o:r "cawse!') 
and the Object (or "contentn) and ~..ill therefore be in first :roa~tion 
i-n ·the deep structure·. The so-called Psych.:.Movement verbs a.re 
verbs which require a transforma.iion which moves the highest non-
l~xperiencer noun-phrase into the f'irst position. The Passive 
transformation is e. more general re.;.ranking transformation 1 havin~ 
the effect of puttihp; an original Experiencer or Object or Goal 
~ouri-phrase into first position, inducing a modification in the ro~ 
of the verb, and associating the preposition [byJ with the noun-
phrase that got demoted, (I once associated the preposition (byJ 
with the Ap,ent noun-phrase, but that was wrong. It is introduced 
as a result of' the operation of the PassiYe tramiforma.tion and .is 
a$SOciated with whatev.er noun-phrase was in highest-rank posit.ion 
in the deep structure.). · 
5; There are innumerable problems that come up i~ any effort to 
fill in the details of a r,ra.mmar like this, and I will devote the 
rest of this paper to a discussion of some of them. The first .that 
come to mind are those that have to do with the notion of agency. 
What should we understand about a sentence if we know that one of 
its cas.es is Agent? llow do we determine whether a. verb obligatorily 
or optionally takes Agent nouri-phruses? In what way" a.re notions 
like .movement, intention, causation and result related to under-· 
standings of sentences containing AP,ent noun-phrases.
~'he moijel allows. only two cases for noun-phrases that can appear in 
~ubj ect vo:. itiou in sirn:ple co.used-event :zentences, requirinl¾ both a 
snecial nccount of tl!e analysis of sentences that sa~r som.et1dng _a:iout thinp,s 
caused by natural forces and. a special explanation of situations in vhich 
there is a chain or causation. To take the second issue firs~: 
there are ma..ny events in the world which involve chains of causation. 
If my claim about the case structure of sentences is rip,ht, it should 
follow that where there is a causation cha.in, with one thing leading 
to another, the gra:mniar of simple sentences a.llovs mention of only 
the principal ca.use and the immediate cause, and does not allow 
mention of any o:f the intervening elements. I believe this is so, 
and I'll use an example offered by Donald Davidson to illustrate it. 
Su~pose a man swings a baseball bat and the bat hits a baseball, 
suppose the baseball moves through the air and impinp,ea on a 
windov~ and suppose that as a result the window breaks. The ~rammar 
of simple sentencea i:n English allows us to say CThe man broke the 
vindow.J or [The baseball broke the window.. J, but not, as a 
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description of the situation I just described, [The bat broke the 
windo..r.J. The nouns that can appear as the subject of the transitive 
verb [break] name either the principal cause, the Agent, or the 
immediate cause, the Instrument, but not any intervening cause. 
Furthermore 7 if we wish to express the role of both Agent and 
Instrument in· a: sentence, we can say [The man broke the window ..ri th 
the baseball.] but not, as a description of this situation, [The 
man broke the window ~'ith the baseball bat.J. 
I believe, therefore, that I can justify havin~ at most two 
ca.sea related to sentences involving causation; but the next thing 
to c0nsider is how one decides which of these two cases should absorb 
the role of phenomena '.lhich are not subject to an,,vbody 1 s control but 
which cause things to happen, as when we speak of things being 
caused by lightning, tuberculosis or erosion. 
The possibility of positing a new case, say "Force," seems 
unnecessary, since this putative Force case never occurs in contra.st 
with either Agent or Instrument. (I recognize, however, the force 
of a suggestion of Renney Huddleson 1s (1970). One way of describing 
the difference between the intentional and accidental interpretations 
of John 1s involvement in actions identified by the sentence (John 
broke the window.] is to say that on one reading [John] is Agent, 
on the other [John) is Force. On the Agent interpretation, we think 
of John as a sentinent being; on the Poree interpretation, we think 
of John as a force of nature.} 
The question is, if Force should be grouped with either Agent 
or Instrtllllent, which one should it be? Let us suppose that we decide 
to link forces with agents. The 11princ1pal cause" interpretation 
of the Agent case seems for many sentences to be quite adequate: if 
thunder frightened the baby by the baby's having perceived the 
thunder, then the thunder can be certainly thought of' as the principal 
cause of the baby 1 s experience. But there are a. few problems 
associated with this assignment. For example, the case hierarchy 
puts an Agent alwo.ys in first position, me.king it in general possible 
for sentences having Agents to contain Instrument phrases as well; 
but impossible for sentences having Instruments as suojects to contain 
Agents as well. If our putative case Force were absorbed into the 
Agent case, it would then be necessary to a.dd the special information 
that Agent noun-phrases which represent acts of God or changes in 
nature fall to occur in sentences which contain Instruments or 
instrur.iente.lly construed [byJ-clauses. This is to account for the 
fact th~t we do not find sentences like [Air pollution killed rn..,v 
petunias with cyanide.] or [The thunder frightened the cattle with 
lightning.], If, on the other hand, the Force were grouped with 
the Instrument rather than with the Agent, such facts would turn out 
not to be special facts about force-of· -nature sentences , but would 
already be explained by a combination of the one-instance-per-clause 
principle and the case hierarchy. 
Another reason one might huve for absorbing Force into the 
Instrument case is that then the natural-force noun-phrnses would 
be seen as havin~ the sa.me role in sentences about their typical 
event-causing function and in sentences about situations in which 
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tqey are controlled by some agent af'ter all. It is well known t,ha.t  
.one can control phenomena. in nl'l.ture ~ither by beinii; God or by· beiµp;  
trained.and eqUi!Jped in.such arts as cloud~Seeding and germ Warfare.  
~he assignment o~ natural-force noun-phrases with the Instrument  
case would also be consistent with my view that it is possigle for  
the Instrument.case to be occupied by a sentence, but not possible  
for the Agent; the benefit here is that a great ma.ny or the  
natural-force noun-phrases can be thought of as being derived from  
sentenc.es. .  
There are languages in which the forces of nature are sometimes  
thought of as animated or deified by the speakers of the languaRe;  
for such languaP,es, ~e might be advised, the force-of-nature nouns  
should be assigned the A.gent case. I don't believe.t,ha.t will be  
necessar.r. If it turns out that all ne.ture.J. phenomena are thought  
.of as personifiedt then it seems quite unnecessary to make such an  
interpretation _for· the simple reason that we 9ould just as veli s·ay  
that ve are talking about the beliefs of speakers as that we are '  
talking about toe properties of their grammars. If, on the other  
hand, it turns out tha.t ~ forces of nature are personified ·while  
,others are not' then w-e could indeed agree to assign the 'nouns t,he  
.Agent case i~ certain sentences, but we would do so by assuming that 
here the words are funetioninP, in fact as proper names and refer to 
things like. the god of thunder or the spirit of fire ra.the.r than to 
the phenomena. themselves. 
Talk a.bout Agents and Instruments he.ving a role in sentences  
the.t have something or other to do with ca.use.tion raises the question  
of the case structure of' the English verb CcauseJ. I recall once  
hurriedly vriti~g that the verb-tcauseJ is one which requtres an  
Agent, but that .is clearly false. In sentences like (The glare of  
'!;,he sunlight caused the accident.J or CThe accident caused the  
revolution.] there is no allusion to agency, and it would obviously  
be necessary to attribute Instrument-hood to. the subjects of the~e  
sentences (in the sense of Instrument that I have been discussing),  
We can see~ therefore, that the Agent case is at least not obli~atory.  
Is it then optional? Can we say that in a sentence like CShe caused  
the accident by screaming.] we have as Agent CsheJ and as Instrument  
a (byJ-clause coming from [She screamed,)? The reasons for suggesting  
that must be justified independently of the process by ·which the  
sub,1ects ot' CbyJ-clo.uf!es can asswne a role e.s subjects of [causeJ  
quite independently of their oeing understood as Agents, as in  
sentences like CShe caused the a.ecident by having left. her drs:pes  
open.J. There will be more to say.a.bout the verb [ca.,useJ belo.r.  
r;. The recognition of the need to deal with cn.usntion as a 
consequence-relation between two events comes up in i::he uroblem of 
determining the ca.::;e structure of certain kinds or uimpingement" 
verbs--that i.s, verbs of impact like ChitJ and [strike], and verbs 
o,f pressure like CpushJ and CshoveJ. It has been throup;h an attempt 
to gi •re a. uniform case structure ane.lysi s of these verps that I 
have been forced to give up the lexicalist position I started out 
with nnd to recognize more indirect sorts of relations between deep 
~d surface structures than I had been orig:ina.lly viilin~ to cou.ritenance. 
255 
Suppose that we would like to characterize. certain facts 
about impingement verbs in terms of their similsrity to verbs of 
motion, and suppose that ve view them as expressing the situation 
in which there is something which moves and there is some destine.tfon 
or goal or direction which further characterizes this motion~ -The' 
thing which moves, as in tQe straightforward analysis of motion 
verbs, is the Object, and the thing to which it moves, or on which 
it impinges, can be thought of as the Goal. In sentences like 
(John hit the fence with his cane.J or [John hit his cane against 
the fence.J, John is the Agent, the fence is the Goal, and John's 
cane is the moving Object. In [John pushed against the wall with 
his ca.ne.J, John is the .Agent 9 thc_vall is the Goal, and again 
John's cane is the Object. These sentences are thus seen as having 
a certain similarity with sentences like [John dropped the dishes 
onto the floor.J, the detailed differences in the ways +n vhich we 
interpret the cases being related to the different semB.ntic properties 
of the verbs. (This analysis differs, by the way, from one given in 
my pa.per on "The grammar of hitting and brea.king, 11 just recently 
published but written a long time ago. (Fillmore 1970)). 
The e.na.lyais seems quite adequate in sentences in which one 
speaks of the thing which is impinged on as merely being· there, but 
a problem arises when we consider how to analyze sentences like CI 
hit the ball over the fence.] and CI pushed the table into the 
corner,],· What we a.re dealing with h~re are situations in vhich the 
impinged upon thing itseif moves. If there were reasons for treatinP. 
the impinged upon thing as the Goal in the earlier analysis, there 
a.re reasons for treating it e.s Object in these sentences ·,:ind for· 
treating Cover the fence] and [into the cornerJ as exemplifying the 
Goal case. Either these verbs ha.veto be given different analyses 
for their occurrence in these different sentences, or the second set 
of sentences needs to be reconstructed in such a vay as to allow the 
same entity to be both Goal and Object. 
This last choice requires us not only to recognize sentences 
a.bout hitting the ba.11 over the fence or pushing the table into the 
corner as complex, but as complex in a way which requires some sort 
of association between clauses that cannot be thou~ht of as compounding 
the two together or as e~bedding one into the other. We need to 
be able to recognize tho.t the latter sentences involve an understanding 
of event causation, according to which the occurrence of one event 
has the occurrence of another event as its consequence. In CI hit 
the b~ll over the ·rence.J .we would have to posit somethin~ like 
(clause i) CI hit the ball] and (clause ii) [The ball vent. over the 
fence.J, the two clauses embedded to a higher predicate that has a 
meaning suggested by the word [cause], predicating the event-
causation relation between the two clauses. The first clause is 
embedded as Instrument, in its immediate~cause function; the second 
clause is embedded as Goal, in its resultinp,-state function. In the 
first cla.us_e Cthe ba.llJ is Goal, in the second clause it is Object. 
The consequence of this decision is the acceptance of a model of 
grammar in which the rules for transforming deep structures into 
surface structures will be fussier than I used to want to think~ nnd 
the admission of prele:idca.1 transformations that a.re ;Ln fnct .n bit 
more contplicsted than McCawley 1 s Predicate lta.ising t:ransforma.tion. 
(Mccawley, 1968). We ·ha.ve here a situation in which one event 
serves as the immediate cause of some other event. Somehow the 
transformations vhich ;will convert a strl;ICtUre meaning soriethinri; like 
D~ hitting the be..11 9ausea it to go over.the fence.J into CI hit 
the ball over the fence.J will have to f'orm out of all three verbs 
a lexical construct of the form (by hitting cause to moveJ and wiil 
have to conflate (to use Leonard,Talmy 1s term} the two constituent 
clauses into one. In the nbsence of detailed and principle p~oposals 
for desi~ninP. a grammar which incorporates rules which do whnt I 
think needs to be done, all this is q_u~te. unsatisfactory; but I Jmo·.r 
th.flt when and if it is done, it will serve'to make Bnglish look a 
little bit more like those languages in which the only va._y to say 
CI hit the ball over the fence.l is to say something like CI hit 
toe ball;· it went ove~ the fence.J, and the only way to say CI 
knocked the man down.~ is to say something like CI hit the man; he 
fell down.], 
~'he restl."ucturina processes that I have been aj.luding to appear 
to be governed by specific lexice.1 items, and that sµggests that 
the conflation process should indeed be cons_t.rued as one which 
creates complex lexical constructs in a way sup:;izested by McCawleyts 
?red.j.cate Raising principle, wi t,h the lexicon specif)•ing which of 
these creations have been lexicalized in the language. It is posrdble 
to push against a table a.nd as a result to have that table mo,,e into 
the corner. English allows us to sa.y [He pushed the table into the 
corner.J. It is possible to lean ae;a.inst a. table and a.s a result 
to have that table move into the corner. En~lish does not allow us 
to Sfl.Y Clle leaned the table into the corner.;:!. One way of cnpturinr: 
such facts ia to sa.y that the lexicon of English contains the 
information that CpushJ substitutes for [by pushinp; against c·ause to 
move), but it fails to specif'.r a lexical item capable of substit11tinp: 
f'or Chy leaning ago.inst cause to mo•teJ • 
. Not:.'i.. ce that it was my attempt· to. preserve certain principles of 
case struc"ture that fa.reed me to consider this possibility. I want 
to believe that there is a basic sense of verbs like Cµush) and Chit] 
according to which they can be assigned their deep-structure case 
frames, that the ca.se..:.:rrames associated· with verbs of motion include 
the Source and Goal cases in their change-of-location functions, and 
that both the semantic and syntactic additional properties of 
sentences in which these verbs sug'gest the notion of resulting 
movement can be accounted for by the kind o'f process that I have in 
mind. The model will. have to point o:ut, for [pushJ, that the Goal 
noun-phrase takes th,e preposition (against~ in the unconflated 
cl1tuse, but that the lexical item CpushJ wh.foh :replaced the i;:onstruction 
~arme~ for the conflated clause takes that same noun-phrase as its 
direct object. This not only acco.unt:; for the fact that clauses 
with (push a.gainstJ do not occur with location-changing Source and 
Goal expre::mions while clauses with Just [push] ma.y, but it also 
accounts :for the fa.ct that the idea of resultant moti_on exists al$O 
in the superrlcil:\lly simple sentence [John pushed the table,J. 
,,;..; 
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7..If we agree that there are reasons·to reach these conclusions 
for cause-to-move verbs like CpushJ, ChitJ, etc. , we mip:ht then 
ask questions along a similar line about the analysis of another 
class of verbs involving both the notion of l:llOvement and the notion 
of ms.nner, meMs or medium of movement--verbs like CfloatJ, CrideJ, 
CswimJ, CslipJ, etc. Each of these. verbs looks as if it can be 
given tvo case analyses, depending on whether it is interpreted as 
a verb of motion or not, the two analyses requiring furthermore that 
the spatial and temporal inten.r~tations of Sources and Goals lead 
to an addition to the total number of cases. That is, ve can sny 
either [He svam from noon until 2 o·, clock.) or [He sva.m from the 
end of the dock to the shore.J. This, you will recall, is one of 
the contexts vhich challenged the use I wanted to make of the 
complementarity principle for the·Source. and Goal cases. 
To use examples borrowed from Leone.rd Te.11\\Y, we can speak of 
a bottle floating on the water, and ve speak of the bottle 
floating into the cove. In the one case there is just the matter 
or some object being suspended by its medium; in the other case 
:there ia the additional matter of its moving from one place to 
another. GraJnmatical theory needs to provide some way of separatinp, 
these two aspects, 
,A sema.ntic reason for wanting to be able to deal separately-
with the motion and manner aspects of certain expressions containin~ 
these verbs is that under certain conditions we can focus on one or 
the other of the two. Take for example permission-seeking sentences 
involving the verb CswirnJ. Suppose you are the guard at the entrance 
or a. ce.ve that a stream flows into, and ram going to ask you for 
permission to enter the cave swimming. Suppose in the first 
ins'tance tnLt I am already in the water and swimming. In this case 
it is simply known in advance that I am swimming, and what I need 
to ask permission for is to enter the cave, In this first case what 
I would say is [Nay I swim in?J, with hea.V'J stress on CinJ. In the 
second inst~~ce, suppose youhave already given me permission to 
enter the cave, a.nd what I a.~ after is your consent to do so in the 
we.ter. In that cese what I must ask is [May I ~wim in? J, this time 
with heavy stress on CswimJ. Verbs which do not have this sort of 
double-barreled interpretation, verbs like CcorneJ and fgoJ, do 
not have this variety in stress placement potentio.l either. I can 
say [.Mey I co:ne in?J, but not [May I eome in?J. The stressing for 
CswimJ when it is "used s.s a verb of motion" is the same a::;.that 
of the pure motion verbs. Possibiy what we need, then, is an 
analysis by vhich the motion-verb CswimJ is really complex, being 
a substitute for something like [by swim.~in~ goJ, with the stressing 
of [in) in the surface sentence determined accc:,rding to whether the 
underlying sentence contains a [goJ-cleuse or not. 
Grammatical theory, then, must provide some we:y of recognizing 
an association between two clauses such that the one designates 
what one might roughly call the mann~r in which the event mentioned 
by the second clause takes place.· In this instance, he.vin8 the two 
clauses cmoedded to Instru.~ent and Goal and comm~nded by the verb 
CcauseJ does not seem particularly natural. In defense of the 
possibility of calling on some sort of causs,l notion tor the 
analysis, however, it should be.pointed out that the English verb 
CcauseJ has not only the interpretation by which one event has 
another event as its c9nsequence, but has other uses as well. · 
That is, there is both a stative verb [cause] and an active verb 
[cause] •.The a.otive verb a:pp~ars in a se:i:itence like (Susan's 
screaming ca.used Fred. :to drop the tray.J; the stative verb appears 
in the sentence CSusan1 s living nearby causes m~ to prerer thi$ 
neighbo~hood.J. A not particul~ly eiegant vey of using an 
analogous anal.ysis of the manner-of-motion ve~bs as I suggested 
for the cause-motion verbs discussed in the last section is to 
embed the manner cla~se in the Instrument, the motion clause in 
the Object, and have both clauses be commanded by l:cause:J--this 
time, the stative. verb Cca~seJ. (The difference is that the use 
of the Goal case ror the ChitJ !U}d (pushJ verbs suggested that the 
motion clause indicated a consequence or result of the action 
indicated by the Instniment clause. ) Mow ire at least ha.ve some 
wa:y of talking about the two senses of CcauseJ, we have set up 
structures which will require our poorly understood but by now 
familiar process ot conflation, we have created the need for lexical 
rules or the form "Substitute CswiinJ for the lexical construct 
Cmove by swinup.ingJ , " e.nd we have underlying structtares for English 
which look something like wbat we will need for languages vhich do 
not a.llov conflation in these situations but which require surface 
sentences to keep the verbs separated (as in Spanish Centr6 
i'lota.ndoJ, "entered :t'1oa.ting," or Japanese Caruite kita.J, "came 
walking" ) • 
In the next section I will suggest that what might have looked 
like straightforward instances o.f causatives requiring nothing more 
than McCe.vley's Predicate Raising·might really involv¢ something 
more likr; the c(?nfla.tion processe~ r have in. mind. 1!n pa.rticu!a:r I will 
propose that CkillJ vill turn out to be the lexical substitution 
for the construct Cby doing something cause to dieJ rather than tor 
the construct Cc~use to dieJ, 
8. I have said nothing so .far a.bout the t1'o cases that I call 
Location and Time. That ia, I haye said nothing about µlace and 
time notion.a independ.,ntly of e>...'l)ressiona .about changing or moving. 
One possibility for dee.ling with these cases is that of saying 
that they e.re optional complements of essentially any predicator. 
Another possibility is that of saying that clauses that e.re capable 
of designating actions or events or situations which can be located 
iµ space and time are themselves to be embedded into higher s.entences 
containing as their main verb something like Coccurl or [happen], 
with the understanding that it is this.higher verb which takes 
Location-and-Time-introduci!)e:; cases. (Some..Yerbs take Location and Time 
complements directly, as for·example CbeJ in one o~ its use$~ 
[live]~ and [spendJ, a.a in CThe beer was in the gara.gGi yesterda,y. J, 
CI lived in Milwaukee in the forties, J, and [Jeffrey· .spent Tu.ea;day 
afternoon at the bea.ch.J.) 
One reason one might have for accepti~e a Location-e.nd-Ti~e-
introducing higher eentence with [occur] is that it~ presence can 
,,  
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serve to ex-olain conditions under which the contlation process is 
blocked; r•d iike to iilu~trate this point by consider:mg the 
analysis according to vhich CkillJ is taken as a lexical substitution 
for Ccause to becoine not a.iiveJ. ·ont-1cCa.wley•s analysis there is a 
single chain of embedding in structures yielding the verb CkillJ. 
If for my senten·ces about pushing. tables into corners .and hitting 
balls over fences there were reasons to separate the clauses whii:::h 
designated th~'causing event from the clauses which designated 
the resulting event, there may well oe equally good reasons for 
assuming the same for verbs like CkillJ. Tha.t analysis, however, 
would require that the Instrument or causing clause contain a verb 
that never show~ up on the surfacet something having the m~aning of 
(act] 'or [do something]. An analysis we might give to [John killed 
the ret,J would be something like [John's actions caused t~e rat 
to die. J. The verb [killJ, then.. substitutes for the coni'la.ted-
cla.use construct [by doing sonething cause to die], 
.Since we are dealing here with two distinct events, each·will 
havei in the world in which it occurs, its own separate place and 
time coordinates., If eit.her of the clauses designating these two 
separ~te events has its own time a.nd place coordinates s~ecifiedt 
by being separately embedded to [occur]~ the conflation is not 
possible. If l Yas standing on the Ohio side or the border on 
Tuesday of last week and shot an arrow at a cougar on the indiana 
side, mid if the cougar then wandered into Illinois and died of the 
wound on Friday, I cannot say that I killed a cougar in Ohio, or in 
Illinois, or in Indiana, or that I killed it last 'I'uesday or last 
Friday. I can say, however, [I killed a cougar in the middle west 
last week. J, and tha.t is because the conflation process i,s :possible 
if th,e event-chain sentence is left intact but embedded as a whole 
to the higher verb which assigns the location in space a.nd time to 
the whole sequence. 
9. T"nere are now some a.dditional proble.'lls with clauses that indicate 
movement. The first thing to notice is the fact that Source and 
Goal, the starting point and the destination, do not exhaust the 
complement possibilities for verbs of motion. In addition to the 
complements or Source and Goal, there is the complement type that 
David Bennett has called "l'a.th, 11 (Bennett 1970) exemplified in the 
last phrase of CHe valked fl-om the cemetery gate to the chapel 
alon~ the canal.J. A particularly interesting property of the 
Puth (or "Itinerative 11 7) case is that a sentence vith the path 
designated can contain a.n unlimited number of Path expressions, ns 
long as these a.re understood as indicating successive stretches 
ot: the same path. This ~an be seen in a sentence like [He walked 
down the hill across the bridge through the pasture to the 
chapel. J. 
Superficially, at least, the Path case requires a qualification 
of the m~e-instance-per-clause principle. As it happens; the 
Location and Time cases dot too. Consider a sentence like [He 
'W!lS sitting under a tree in the park on a, bench Tuesday afternoon 
about three o 1clock.J, a type of sentence discussed by Bennett. 
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It's clear t.hat we ha.ve in this sentence just one place specification 
and just one time speei:f'ics.tion~ so on the. $~mantic level the one-
instance-per-ciause principle is not violated; butt cannot sa;y 
more than that. ~h~re a.re paraphrases of these constructions by 
which all of the noun-phrases that need to be link.e~ together can be 
Unked together by means or relative els.use embedding and conjunction, 
but since such a w,zy of dealing with the problem does not seem 
applicable tQ the problem of the multi-phrase Path, there may be 
other we::,s of seeing ,,hat 1.s going on. 
10. But now, what about all these prepositions? If the cases 
indicate the basi·c semantic functions of nouns, hov does the case 
apparatus play a role in determining the selection of, specific 
p:r"epositions like CatJ, ConJ, CinJ, CtoJ, ContoJ, ,[fromJ, Coff ofJ, 
[out of'J. CviaJ~ [a.cross], tthroughJ, as weil as Ca.longJ, [under], 
CbesicleJ, and t.he rest. The principles of qontrast suggest that, 
for example, CtoJ, ContoJ and tintoJ are all instances or the Goal 
caae, because although, expressions containing them can occur vith 
Source expressions~ they cannot occur in the same sentence vith other 
Goal expressions. ·But the principle of complementary distribution 
wh,en based on surface evidence fails to show their identity. That 
ist we can speak of something as being located (at the corner], (on 
the cornerJ, or Cin the cornerJ, or as moving [from the cornerJ, 
Co:ff o:r the eorrierJ, or Cout,of the cornerJ. The only vay we have 
for preserving the complementarity principle for the selection of 
individual prepositions and for claiming that the preuositions that 
we would intuitively like to group'together are marke~s of the same 
case, is to impute certs.in differences to the underlying structure 
of the associated noun.;..phre.ses and sa.y that these dee:r differences 
are what determine the selection of individual prepositions. FollowinF, 
vork by Geoffrey Leech (1970), we might wa.nt to say that nouns that 
occur in.locative expressions c&n have imputed to them such properties 
as that of being a point or a surface or a volume, or that of being 
a'part o~.a surface ?r a volllll1e, or that of beine a point or an area 
above or below or behihd or in front or or to the side of some 
ooJect, and so on. Innumerable ways of representing this information 
suggest themselves; whatever means we come ~cross eventually for 
showing these distinctions in unde:rlying representations, I assume 
at least that there won't need to be any changes in our understanding 
of the case relations themselves. 
11. Expressions of duration and d:i.stince introduce new orders of 
problems for a case analy~is of verbs of movement and change, because 
they somehov seem to .£2!3~ the Source and, G.oa.1 notions into a single 
unit, a nhypercase" o.s it were. That is, we can se.y CHe lived there 
f'rom March· llhtil September. J or me lived there for five months , :J • 
but combinations of these are not possible in simple sentences. We 
cannot say me lived there from Ma.rch for fiv-e months. J. Similarl:r, 
we ~an say CHe walked from Palo Alto to Sun Jose.J or CHe walked 
thirty miles. J, but not CHe walked from Palo Alto thirty miles. J. 
have no proposals in mind for capturing thi~ fnct, and I recognize 
th&t when I acknowledge this as approblem for the theory~ I must also 
I 
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ac]:ulowledge the seriousness of the proposal that there might be 
some "hypercase11 that similarly covers the Agent and Instrument case. 
12. I have concentrated mostly on matters of space and time and 
movement in this paper, but let me now just briefly mention one or 
tvo other conceptual problems that the case grammarian faces. Just 
about eyery time tba.t I have listed what I took to be the case 
notions needed for grammatical. theory-, I added, as if under my 
brea.th, "and possibly Benefe.ctive. 11 There a.re some unhappy fact.s 
about· Benefactive constructions that suggest that the case status of 
the associated noun-phrase is simply not like those of the others. 
Benefactive constructions occur only in sentences with Agents, and 
only when the Agent's role is thought of e.s being"deliberate or 
voluntary. To add Benefa.ctive to the list of· ·cases would thus 
require that the theory be complemen~ed with a system of redundancy 
principles regarding the selection of cases for sentences, and would 
require furthermore that an understanding of the expression or 
intentionaJ.- or voluntary acts be accounted for within the case 
eppa.ratus. Since I run unwilling to face that possibility, my 
alternative is to reconsider the semantics of sentences with 
Benefactive phrases. It seems to me that a sentence of the form 
!:John did it for me.J can be understood as involving three basic 
notions; the one vho does something, the Agent· (CJohnJ); his action 
or "offering,'' the Object {[John did it.J); a.nd the "direction" or 
receiver of that action or offering, (CmeJ}, the" Gonl. It can be 
given a higher-sentence analysis, in other words, ~ith Agent, 
Object and animate Goal, with the deed performed for somebody's 
benefit being expressed as the sentence embedded ill the Object case. 
The obligatory presence of the Agent case is accounted ror by the 
embedding conte~, and the intentionality of the performnnce on 
the part of the Agent can be built into the semantic structure of 
the higher verb. Verbs vhich satisfy these case frame and semantic 
conditions are verbs of the .type [giveJ or EofferJ. I -propose, 
then, that sentences with Benefactives in them really come from 
more.complicated constructions in which it is spelled out that some-
body offers some deed to somebody else, and I posit for this an 
abstract verb of giving. The clause-conflating principles then, 
however they uretto be stated, will have the effect of changing 
something like CI give you (I do it)J into CI do it for you.J; 
for some languages, like for example Mandarin and a number of the 
langUap;es of West Africa~ the conflation process does not take 
place? and we get on the surface something like what I 1ve proposed 
for the deep structure. 
13. · I have said that the experiencer of a psychological event is 
represented by a noun phrase in the Experiencer case, and that some 
other case will indicate the cause or the content of that psychological 
experience. !n a sentence lik~ CI imagined the accident.], I arr. 
inclined to call Cthe accident] the Object, and say that it 
identifies the content of the experience; in a sentence like CTbe 
noise 1,rig!".tened me. J, I regard [the noiseJ as the Im,trument, Yhere 
I.have in mi,,nd ths.t sen~e of Inst:ruments vhich covers the stimultls  
or reactedwto situa.tion·in the description of a mental event.  
Sometimes both Instrwnent a.nd Object co-occur in the descriptiori  
of some mental event~ as in [The noise reminded me of the accident.];  
that is wby I believe both Instrument and Object are needed, in  
add:i.tion to Experiencer 1 in the d~script.ion <>f psychological-event  
predice.tors. ,  
These Bl:"e intuitive decisions, a.nd 'for a number of sentences  
my intuitioqs 1..ail. In a. sentence like [John loves Ma.:ry. J , is  
Mary the cause or the content of John's experience? Do tfearJ and  
CfrightenJ differ only in th&t the latter requires Psych Movement,  
or is the non-1\!Xperiencer case ror.CfearJ the Object, that for.  
[frightenJ the Instrument? Understandings that can be assigned to  
the aepa.rate cases might then explain why we allov ourselves to  
conclude such different things regarding the inner world of some- 
body who says CI used ~o fear the devil.) as opposed to somebody.  
·.rho ways C:The devil used to frighten me. J. Regrettably, I do not  
know how to answer thes~ questions. ·  
14. So far! have spoken only about certain conceptual problems  
associated .rith the effort to .recons.truct e. t:ransforma.tional e:ram.mar  
along the lines of a case gre.mxn.a.r. You may have noticed tha.t I  
have so far.failed to give tree dis.grams or any other sort of  
explicit symbolic representations.of' the structures I have been so  
cavalierly talking a.bout. That failure stems .not mereJ,y from a.  
desire to s~ve space. I simply have not round an acceptable  
notation for, the sorts of things :i: want to be a.ble to represent.  
· The main problem is how one c~n indicate the case role of noun- 
phrases and embedded cl~usea in the sentences of which they &rec  
constituents, and vhat consequences the choice of notation has  
for the operation of the grammar.  
One possibility for a notation is the one by which cases are  
indicated as features on nouns. for a sentence like [John gave the  
flower to Mary.J, the complex SYJllbOl associated with CJ'ohnJ cont6,ins  
· the feature ·+~ent, that associated with Cf'lowerJ contains the · 
feature +ObJect, and that associated with CMary} contains the feature 
+Goal. I find this inadequate, f'irst of all because the notion of 
case has nothing to do with properti~s of nouns, but rit'ther with 
:relations or metarela:t:f.ons which nouns have vith the rest of the 
<;la.use in which they occur. ·A seco{ld reason for finding it inadequate 
is tha.t it f'orces all instances of' clause embedding to be treated as 
instances of adjunction to nouns. This might be workable in some 
contexts, out not, I think, in. all, Thus, CJohn's screaming caused 
· ti-:.e a.ccident •. J ca.n be interpreted as (The event of John 1p 
screaming caused the accident.J, and [That John loves Mary amuses 
Mary.J can be interpreted as [The fact that John loves Mary emuses 
Mary.J; but it is n~t so oasy to see what can be done for the 
embedded Object Sentence in, se:y,,. CI suspect that J,ohn loves Ha.ry. J. 
A second possibility is that of assigning case feat-ures to  
veri:ns~ a.11d just saying that for each verb we specify e.s its valence  
a collection·of case rela,tionships 1 t~a.t the number o:f noun-phrases  
the verb cnn occur in construction vith is determined by.the number  
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of cases specified in its ~alence feature, and that the association 
of the individual. noun-phra.ses\rith the individual. cases is to be 
I. . ' < , 
achieved by counting from left to right and by checking of'f the 
cases in accordance with:the cru;.e hierarchy. This too might be 
workable, but it introduces at least two complications; the first 
being that keeping track of the case identity of noun-phrases will 
become difficult after mov.ement transformations a.re applied, 
especially if your theory is not wealthy enough to own deriva.tional 
constraints; the second being that the theory will need to have 
special ways of distinguishing valence in~ormation associated in 
the dictionary with the lexical. item and valence ~eatures occ'Ul"ring 
with those lexical iterns i~ individua.l sentences, in just those 
cases where the item is compatible with any of several combinations 
of cases. 
These are both, in one ve:y or another, fairly bad notations for 
case grammar. ['here is one_ that is still worse, howevel:', and that 
is the one by which ·the case roles of noun phrases are indicated by 
means of labeled nodes dominating the associated sentence or noun-
phrase. The cases are clearly not categories, though in this 
notation they a.re treated just like grammatical categories; the 
theory that represents them in this we.y needs therefore to distinguish 
two ty-pes of category symbols and needs to hav~ variables ranginR 
over case labels; and the'theory needs devices for changing case 
labels, devices for deleting case labels and restructuring what is 
lef't, and so on. The proposal could not be taken seriously enough 
to be included in this discussion were it not for the fact that it 
ia the practice which I have followed; that transformational rules 
stated in its terms are fairly easy to conceptualize; that it follows 
the tradition in transformationalist studies by which labels are 
assigned to verb-phrase constituents and co-constituents that are 
not subjects and objects, such.as Manner e.nd Extent and Time 9hrnses; 
and that since case constituents sometimes need to oe built un with 
the addition of complementizers and prepositions and the like·, the 
cuse labels at least provide foundation nodes onto which these 
enlarged structures can be built. 
Actually the notations vhich are most pleasing to me on the 
deep-structure level are unfortunately notations that lend themselves 
least to the view that aeep structure configurations and surface 
stracture configurations belong to the same species. I have in mind 
a kind or dependency notation vhich makes use 0~ kernel trees or 
stemmas ea.ch containing one root node, one or more labeled branches, 
and a variable or index symbol at the leaf end of each branch. The 
node is a complex symbol containing semantic, phonolo~ical and rule 
features information, as well as the case valence. The branches 
are labeled vith case labels, and are ordered from left to right 
El.Ccordi_ng to the case hierarchy, The variables at the leaf end of 
the branches represent the entities which bear case relations to the 
predicator represented at the node. Any sentence ha.sat base a 
coliection of ste.romas of this type, plus information about identities 
irNolving the variables; either there can be co-reference among the 
variables, or some of the variables can be identified ~ith some of 
the stemma.s. That muc~ identifies the semantic interpretation of 
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the sentence. 
As input to the transformational rules, in :place er the notion 
of deep structure, there is what one might call the com~osition 
plan of the sentence 1 the plan by which the various stemmas are to 
be incorporated into each other to construct the surface sentence. 
The general effect of the composition plan will be to indicate 
which variables are ta be replaced by lexical items and which 
stemmas are to be taken as nexus ror which other stemma$. Using 
Sandra Thompson's examples (1970), the two sentences CI know a 
girl who speaks Basque.] and CA girl I know speaks Basque.J will 
differ only on the level of the composition plan. The transf,ormations 
vill provide for lexical insertion and lexical modification, and 
will somehow provide for the construction of the surface sentence 
from all this. 
I have a re~ proposals abrewine on how such a grammar can 
operate, but problems associated with deletion, topic/comment, 
quantification, and the representation of manner and deeree adverbs 
seem at the moment fairly overwhelming. Being now a Californian, 
I have beco.:ne acquainted with some people who know a lot about magic 
end witchcraft. I am counting on their services to help rne complete 
this resee.rcn. 
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